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representation has been determined collectively by the preferences of past and present workers. In part, unionism can be regarded as a collective response to job characteristics with public good aspects resulting from shared working conditions and interdependencies in the production process, as well as a response to the existence of potential monopoly wage gains. 2 Union status also results in part from private choice, even though collectivelydetermined choices regarding union representation and services are in fact unlikely to match precisely the preferences of individual workers.3 Individual workers sort into job paths which maximize utility ex ante, and union coverage is one of many job characteristics taken into account. Thus, while observed union status of workers will not match exactly their individual preferences, even in right-to-work states where membership is not legally mandatory but likely nevertheless, we believe a choice framework is useful for examining union status since there exists substantial individual freedom in job choice.
The likelihood of a job being covered by a collective bargaining agreement, or similarly, occupied by a union member, is determined by the demand for and supply of union services. Because of data deficiencies and difficulties in modeling union behavior and goals, the estimation of structural demand and supply equations has not been possible. Rather, a union status function must be estimated as a reduced-form equation. Within this framework, factors associated with greater benefits from unionism should increase the likelihood of membership, while factors associated with larger organizing and servicing costs should decrease membership. Throughout, we treat union membership as a proxy for collective bargaining coverage (see fn. 16).
As pointed out by Abowd and Farber [1] , however, the market clearing assumption associated with the supply-demand framework is more appropriate for the determination of union coverage across jobs then for determining the union status of individuals. Union representation can be expected to develop as long as the marginal benefits of unionism are greater than the marginal costs of organizing. However, once coverage is determined, there may be a queue of workers seeking existing union jobs as long as benefits from unionism are not completely capitalized in initiation fees and dues. Thus, we believe the reducedform membership equation is best interpreted as explaining the determination of unionized jobs rather than the choices of individual workers. 4 Previous studies have focused primarily, although not exclusively, on personal characteristics as determinants of union membership. We contend below that a number of firm and industry characteristics are likely to affect significantly the benefits and costs associated with unionism. In addition to firm and industry characteristics, the empirical work contained in this paper examines the effects of sex, race, urbanization, schooling, experience, region, right-to-work laws, and the predicted union-nonunion wage differential on the likelihood of union membership. Because each of these factors has been examined previously, we postpone our brief discussion of these relationships until empirical results are presented. Below we discuss the relationship between unionism and industry characteristics. 
III. The Effects of Industry-Level Characteristics
Workers in firms located in highly concentrated industries are more likely to be unionized due to higher expected benefits and lower organizing costs from unionization. Industries with high concentration of sales are likely to have a high concentration of workers, thus lowering organizing costs. Derived labor demand elasticities of firms in highly concentrated industries are also likely to be lower, thus a union's ability to organize and acquire compensation gains may be greater.5 Finally, higher industry concentration may indicate the possibility of economic profits, and unionism provides a means of redistributing some portion of these profits to workers.6 For these reasons workers employed in more highly concentrated industries are more likely to be union members.
Several empirical studies examine the relationship between concentration and unionism. Utilizing a simultaneous model with aggregate industry data from manufacturing, Ashenfelter and Johnson [3] find the level of unionism to be positively and significantly related to industry concentation, while Kahn [23] finds no significant relationship using a similar analysis. Hirsch [21], also using industry data, finds a significant relationship before, but not after, controlling for average firm sales. Lee [25] , bridging an industry concentration variable to individual data finds it positively related to the likelihood of union membership.
To our knowledge, no previous study has examined directly the relationship between capital intensity and unionization, despite the common belief that such a relationship may be important.7 Capital intensity, as measured by an industry's capital to labor ratio, is expected to positively affect unionization. It is likely that a higher capital to labor ratio implies that labor comprises a smaller fraction of total costs, indicating a more inelastic labor demand as long as the elasticity of substitution is less than the price elasticity of product demand. Greater capital intensity also is likely to indicate greater fixed costs, thus leading to a more inelastic short run labor demand (due to lessened firm mobility) and lower organizing costs. Similarly, capital-intensive firms may be more likely to sustain short-run economic profits, thus increasing the probability of unionism. In addition to the arguments above, Sattinger [30] has suggested there exists a "scale of resources effect" whereby more able workers are matched with greater amounts of capital. If unionism provides a means by which to increase labor quality and productivity, for example by decreasing turnover, then unionism should be more likely in capital intensive industries. Likewise, if the capital-skill complementarity (CSC) hypothesis is correct, implying that the elasticity of substitution between capital and high-skill labor is less than between capital and low-skill labor, then the demand for high-skill union labor may be greater in more capital intensive industries.8 Finally, Duncan and Stafford [9, 361] hypothesize that "unions will be more prevalent in capital-intensive continuous-process activities which give rise to worker effort complementarities, corresponding public goods 5 problems, and incentives to schedule work in a way that will more fully utilize the capital stock."
It is important to note that greater capital intensity not only increases the likelihood of unionism, but also is a predictable microeconomic response to union wage gains, assuming that firms can freely adjust employment to points on their labor demand curve. In the event that unions and firms simultaneously bargain over wages and employment, a settlement off the demand curve at a lower wage and greater employment is preferred by both parties. In this event little can be said a priori about union distortion of the factor mix. Moreover, because unions are likely to decrease profitability and capture some portion of the returns on fixed capital, decreased investment in capital and R&D will in many cases be a rational long-run response to unionism. Unfortunately, we are unable to empirically sort out the direction of causation between unionism and capital intensity within our framework. Thus, caution is exercised in the interpretation of subsequent empirical results.
The relationship between unionism and firm or establishment size is unclear a priori. On the one hand, larger establishments may involve substantially lower organizing costs for a union, implying a positive unionism-size relationship. Moreover, the benefits of union services, particularly institutionalized work, reward, and grievance procedures, are likely to be greater in large establishments where worker-management communication and monitoring may be more difficult. In addition, higher potential profit rates among larger firms will increase expected benefits from organizing.9 On the other hand, formalization of labor contracts and the work environment need not imply unionization, and large nonunion firms may be able to provide some of the same services and structured relationships associated with unionism more easily than small nonunion firms. Moreover, large firms may be able to resist more effectively union organizing, particularly if there exist substantial fixed costs in such activities. 
where Xi is a vector of personal and regional characteristics, Ii is a vector of industry-level characteristics, (ln W,i -In Wni) is the relative union-nonunion wage differential, and Emi is the membership disturbance term distributed N(O,a 2 ). Measured personal and regional characteristics include sex, race, urban residence, schooling, experience and experience squared, residence in a right-to-work state, and region. Industry characteristics are market concentration, capital intensity, establishment size, and the incidence rate of lost workdays from injury and illness (Table I and discussion in Section V provides the definition and source of variables).
The model allows differential wage structures by including separate equations for union and nonunion workers:
In Wui = buo + bul Zui + b2 lui + -ui (2) In Wni = bno + bnl Zni + bn2Ini + ni,
where the disturbance terms ,ui and ,ni are also normally distributed, the Zis are vectors of personal characteristics including all variables in Xi, plus variables measuring whether health limited work in the previous year, marital status (interacted with sex), number of dependents (interacted with sex), and whether the worker is currently in a craft occupation. Although U* itself cannot be measured its sign can be obtained since it is known whether or not a worker is a union member. A variable Ui, defined such that Ui = 1 if U* > 0 and Ui = 0 if U,* < 0, is used as the dependent variable in the estimation of (1). However, the binary nature of Ui makes the use of ordinary least squares inappropriate. and risk. This relationship, not previously estimated, may result from several sources. As previously discussed, greater capital intensity should lead to a lower labor demand elasticity, lower organizing costs, and worker complementarities, each factor tending to be associated with greater union membership. While measurement error will bias the capital coefficient towards zero, simultaneity bias is likely to bias it in the opposite direction. While we believe the strength of the measured relationship suggests that capital intensity has a direct impact on unionism, we are unable to reject the alternative argument that causation runs from unionization to greater capital intensity.
We find strong evidence that unionism among manufacturing production workers is positively related to average establishment size. Coefficient estimates on the personal and regional characteristics variables are consistent with expectations and require only brief discussion.5 Ceteris paribus, males, nonwhites, and urban residents are more likely to be union members by magnitudes of 12, 4, and 8 percent respectively. These findings are believed to result from the lower expected lifetime benefits and higher organizing costs among women, higher expected nonwage gains for nonwhites from grievance procedures and wage standardization policies (nonwhites are found to have higher wage gains in cross-section studies, but not in studies using fixed effects models with panel data), and higher organizing costs and less favorable attitudes towards unionism among rural workers. As in other studies examining unionism among production workers, schooling is found to have little effect on membership.
The union-experience profile is concave, indicating that the likelihood of union membership increases at a decreasing rate, peaking at approximately 35 years of experience. As noted by Abowd and Farber [1] , such a profile confounds the effects of worker preferences (the choice to be in the union queue) and employer preferences (the probability of being chosen from the queue). Young workers tend to receive the largest relative wage gain from membership yet have a lower probability of being hired. Decreased mobility among older workers resulting from firm-specific training, family responsibilities and community ties, and a shortened benefit span may also increase their demand for collective "voice" and union-induced changes in the compensation mix between wages and fringes.
Region and location in a right-to-work (RTW) state significantly affect the likelihood of union membership. Regional variables are believed to reflect differences in preferences and unmeasured differences in personal and industry characteristics affecting the benefits and costs of unionism. Inclusion of RTW is particularly desirable since union membership, as opposed to collective bargaining coverage, is the dependent variable. In W) , to significantly affect the likelihood of membership. However, our sample coverage and data sources differ substantially from those studies and we include a more extensive set of explanatory variables. In addition, the potential wage differential overstates workers' lifetime earnings gains since a higher wage differential may imply less employment security and exludes union dues (on the other hand, the wage differential understates the compensation-differential since the fringe share is greater in union jobs). Because the coefficient on the differential variable exhibited substantial sensitivity to changes in specification, we are hesitant to attach undue weight to this result.
While the primary purpose of this paper has not been to estimate the magnitude of the union-nonunion wage differential, the mean of (In I -n \Wn) generated from equations (2') and (3') provides such as estimate, corrected for sample selection bias. We obtain a log wage differential estimate of .204 using all-worker means, as compared to a non-selectivity (OLS) adjusted estimate of .112 (the percentage differential is simply 100(ed -1), where d is the log differential). '8 As a final exercise, we also examine the effects of industry characteristics on union membership among nonproduction workers in manufacturing. We do not expect a strong relationship with these characteristics since much of the theoretical discussion does not apply closely to white-collar workers, and our aggregate measures of industry characteristics probably measure with greater error the work environment facing individual nonproduction workers.
Table III presents coefficient and standard error estimates for the industry characteristics variables from probit equations, identical to those estimated in Table II except that no wage differential variable is included. For comparison, we also include estimates from the sample of production workers. While the estimated relationships are weaker here than among production workers, we obtain identical qualitative results. Thus, based on our samples of production and nonproduction workers, we conclude that concentration, capital intensity, establishment size, and safety risk increase the likelihood of a job being unionized.
VI. Summary
Relatively little previous attention has been given to the effects of industry characteristics on union membership. In this paper, we contend that several firm and industry-level characteristics should affect union status by affecting both the benefits and costs associated with union coverage. A simultaneous model in which union membership, union wages, and nonunion wages are endogenous is specified. The model is estimated by combining probit estimation and OLS, after correction for selectivity bias due to nonrandom assignment to the union and nonunion samples. Our sample consists of a large microdata set of production workers in manufacturing, bridged with industry characteristics variables.
Market concentration, capital intensity, establishment size, and job risk are found to increase significantly the likelihood of union membership and jobs among production 18. Our .204 selectivity-adjusted estimate included the selectivity variable in calculating the differential. When it is excluded, as in Lee [25] , we obtain a .574 estimate of the log wage differential. As pointed out forcefully in Freeman and Medoff [15] and Lewis [27] , union wage differential estimates obtained using such sample selection techniques have varied so widely that they should not be regarded as reliable.
workers. Identical qualitative evidence is obtained for a sample of nonproduction workers. We believe our results provide strong support for the view that unionism, at least in part, is a response to public goods and production complementarities in the work environment, and that the likelihood of unionization is dependent on expected benefits and organizing costs. The findings reported in this paper also suggest that future research on unionism should focus increased attention on job and industry-level characteristics, while possibly lessening the emphasis placed on personal characteristics.
